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STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an action by the appellants (hereinafter 
referred to as plaintiffs). Said plaintiffs prayed for a 
preliminary injunction restraining and preventing the 
respondents-defendants, Salt Lake County, its officers 
and employees, from issuing any building or other per-
mit which would effect property controlled by an ordi-
nance which became effective on January 11, 1967, 
which amended the zoning of 1.22 acres of property 
located at the southeast corner of 2300 East and 4500 
South, Salt Lake County, Utah, from Residential R-3 
to Commercial C-1. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was decided by the trial court pursuant 
to a hearing on plaintiff's motion for a preliminary 
injunction. The court after hearing testimony and tak-
ing evidence introduced and after submission of memo-
randum by counsel and argument had thereon and the 
court having made and entered its Finding of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, concluded that all the provi-
sions and procedures required by Title 17-27-17, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, and Title 8-1-9 
of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, were 
duly and properly complied with in the amending of 
said zoning ordinance to re-zone said premises from 
Residential Rl3 to Commercial C-1, and that the tem· 
porary restraining Order then in effect should be ya· 
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cated and the plaintiffs' Complaint dismissed together 
\\·ith defendant and intervenor being awarded their 
costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondents-defendants seek reaffirmance of the 
trial court judgment based on the record made before 
the trial court and evidence contained therein as sub-
mitted to and heard by the trial court judge. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Bill Roderick, Inc., is the purchaser, of that certain 
tract of real estate located on the southeast corner of 
23rd East and 4500 South, within the Holladay plan-
ning district and is an intervenor-respondent in this 
appeal. On or about the 3rd day of November, 1966, 
the intervenor made application to amend the zoning 
map of Salt Lake County by reclassifying said proper-
ty from Residential R-3 to Commercial C-1. (Def. Ex. 
D-20) This application was submitted to the Holladay 
Planning District for its recommendation. On or about 
Nov. 18, 1966, the Holladay District Planning Com-
mission recommended approval of the application. The 
1rritten recommendation was submitted subsequently to 
the Salt Lake County Commission recommending ap-
proval, but conditioned that it conform to the Salt Lake 
County master plan. (Pl. Ex. P-1). 
3 
Salt Lake Planning Commission acted upon this 
zoning ordinance and recommended disapproval of the 
application. (Def. Ex. D-23) At the hearing by the 
Planning Commission, two persons living within the 
Holladay Planning District were in attendance and 
made inquiry as to procedures to be followed thereafter. 
(R. 144-146) Said representatives thereupon advised 
the people in the area that the application had been 
denied by the Salt Lake County Planning Commission 
and that approval of said application was unlikely. (R. 
146) Thereupon, the application was forwarded to Salt 
Lake County Commission for its action, including the 
recommendations made by the District Planning Board 
and the Salt Lake County Planning Commission. Be-
cause of the recommendation of disapproval by the 
Planning Commission, a public hearing was required 
before action by the County Commission. A public 
hearing on this application was scheduled to be held 
on the 28th day of December, 1966, along with vari-
ous other applications for changes of zoning. Notice 
of said hearing was accomplished by posting a notice of 
a change of zoning hearing on one public utility pole 
near the intersection of 23rd East and 4500 South, in 
front of the subject property. Another notice of the 
proposed zoning change was posted on a utility pole in 
front of the property owned by a lVIr. Hendricksen, 
but near the subject property. (Def. Ex. D-56, R. 219· 
220) A third notice of zoning was posted on a bulletin 
board on the west entrance of the City and County 
Building in Salt Lake City. (Def. Ex. D-55). A notice 
4 
of said hearing of zoning change applications was 
published along with other applications in the Salt Lake 
Tribune on or about the 26th day of November, 1966. 
(PL Ex. P-7) 
A hearing in due course was held on the appli-
cation and information was submitted to the commission 
presenting facts justifying the change of zoning. Ad-
ditional facts were submitted by other people in attend-
ance at said hearing. (Def. Ex. D-35) 
Said change of zoning was adopted unanimously 
on December 28, 1966 after taking the matter under 
advisement. (Def. Ex. D-37) Thereupon, the new 
ordinance was submitted to the new county commission 
pursuant to due course of business for signature. 
(Def. Ex. D-39) Prior to the signature, sometime 
after the enactment of the ordinance, plaintiffs and 
appellants petitioned the county commission to rescind 
its action, (Pl. Ex. P-48), and a meeting without 
notice to applicant was held and the ordinance subse-
quently signed. This action to invalidate said ordinance 
resulted thereby. 
RESPONDENTS-DEFENDANTS POSITION 
The trial court's decision should be affirmed for 
the following reasons: 
I. That all provisions and procedures required by 
Title 17-27-17 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
' amended, and Title 8-1-9 of the "Revised Ordinances 
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of Salt Lake County" were duly and properly c . r d . h . om 
P ie wit m the amending of said zoning ordinance 
to re-zone said premises from Residential R-3 to Com-
mercial C-1. 
2. That the amended zoning ordinance is valid. 
3. That the county commissioners did not act in 
an arbitrary and capricious manner and that they pro-
erly refused to rehear said matter pursuant to the peti-
tion of the appellants. That further, appellants' petition 
for re-hearing was not based on any statutory proce-
dures or by any authority of law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SALT LAKE COUNTY PURSUANT TO 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY HAS THE POW-
ED TO AMEND ZONING ORDINANCES. 
The legislature has delegated the power to zone 
to Salt Lake County !'io that the need for a protective 
plan might be met and has provided means for the pro· 
tection of private property through notice and public 
hearings. U.C.A. (1953), 17-27-1. 
In pursuing its authority to zone a county, a 
county commission shall perform a legislative function 
and has wide discretion. The action of the zoning au· 
thority is endowed with a strong presumption of validi· 
ty and the courts will not interfere with a commission's 
6 
action unless it clearly appears to be beyond its powers 
or is unconstitutional. Gayland vs. Salt Lake County, 
11 U. 2d 307, 358 P. 2d 633. 
A presumption of validity and reasonableness at-
tends zoning ordinances and amendments thereto. In 
8 ftf cQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3d Ed. 559, Sec. 
25.295, it is further said: 
"The presumption of the reasonableness, vali-
dity and constitutionality of ordinances applies 
fully to zoning ordinances and amendments of 
zoning ordinances. Every intendment in favor 
of their validity is to be indulged. This is particu-
larly true since zoning is governmental and leg-
islative in character, and constitutes an exercise 
of the police power to promote the public welfare. 
It is presumed that the zoning power has been 
exercised reasonably by the zoning ordinance and 
that the ordinance is for purposes and within the 
scope of the police power. That is to say, it is 
presumed that such an ordinance is designed to 
promote the public welfare. The court will pre-
sume that in enacting a zoning ordinance the 
(city council) acted with full knowledge of rele-
vant conditions and circumstances ... " 
POINT II 
SALT LAKE COUNTY GAVE ADE-
(~UATE NOTICE OF THE HEARING TO BE 
HELD DECEMBER 28, 1966, AS REQUIRED 
BYLAW. 
Section 17-27-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, provides: 
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"Before finally adopting any such amend-
ment, the board of county commissioners shall 
hold a public hearing th~reon, at least thirty 
days' notice of the time and place of which shall 
be given by at least one publication in a news-
paper of general circulation in the county and by 
posting in three public places designed to give 
notice thereof to the persons affected." (Em-
phasis added) . 
Provisions in statutes requiring notice preparatory 
to the enactment or amendment of zoning measures 
typically provide for constructive rather than actual 
notice as the publication in a local newspaper for a 
specified number of times. Ordinances based pursuant 
to them have been attacked as invalid in that without 
actual notice the owner has been deprived of his prop-
erty without due process of law. The courts have rather 
uniformly held that this contention is groundless and 
that the statute need not provide for nor the ordinances 
be passed upon actual notice. See Wanamaker vs. City 
Council of El Monte (1962) 200 Cal. App. 2d 453, 19 
Cal. Rptr. 554. 
Where the notice of a proposed rezoning hearing 
is given, by a publication in a newspaper in accordance 
with the State Statute, the fact that a property owner 
effected by the rezoning did not read the particular news-
paper in which the notice was published, does not in-
validate the notice. Braden vs. Much ( 1949) 403 Ill. 
507, 87 N.E. 2d 620. (Emphasis added) 
The adequacy of particular newspaper publica-
tions of the notice required by various zoning statutes 
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have been questioned in a number of instances. In ab-
sence of the particular statutory requirements, the 
publications need not be given any special notoriety by 
reason either of the size of print, location in newspapers 
or number of publications. A single publication notice 
prior to a hearing to amend a zoning ordinance was 
held sufficient compliance with the statutory provisions 
requiring at least fifteen days' notice in Central Realty 
Corp. vs. Allison ( 1951) 218 SC 435, 63 S.E .2d 153. 
"The tests which will generally determine the 
questions of whether the notices were posted in 
public places within the meaning of the statute is 
whether the posting of the notices in the particu-
lar places fulfilled the purpose giving the pub-
licity contemplated by the nature of the notice 
required." Wann vs. Re-organized School Dist. 
No. 6 of St. Francois County, 293 S.W. 2d 408, 
413. 
The United States Supreme Court in Mullane vs. 
Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 206 
70 S. Ct. 652. ( 1950) acknowledged that the require-
ment of due process in any proceeding which is to be 
accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under 
all the circumstances, to appraise interested parties and 
afford them an opportunity to present their objections. 
Section 17-27-17, of the Utah Code provides that 
notice be given by posting in three public places de-
signed to give notice thereof to the persons effected. 
The following discussion illustrates that the Salt Lake 
County Commission did observe the statutory mandate 
and its notice requirements. 
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(a) The County Did Use Adequate :Modes or 
ltlanner of Giving Notice in Public Places as Required 
by Law. 
Salt Lake County pursuant to the above mentioned 
statute posted notice in the Salt Lake Tribune on 
or about November 26, 1966. Notices were also pub-
lished in three public places located in Salt Lake 
County. Mr. Preston E. Evans, employed by the Dt:-
partment of Zoning Administration of Salt Lake 
County, testified, and in his testimony identified (Def. 
Ex. D-55) , which was a notice of a zoning hearing and 
testified that he posted a notice of hearing on the south 
bulletin board of the west entrance of the City and 
County Building on November 23, 1966. (R. 214-215) 
Mr. Clair J. Hardman, also employed by the De-
partment of Zoning Administration of Salt Lake 
County, testified that he posted two notices of a zoning 
hearing in this matter on two utility poles, one of which 
was adjacent to the property, and the other about 200 
feet south thereof, in Holladay, Utah. Mr. Hardman 
was shown and he identified (Def. Ex. D-56) which in-
dicated the location of two of the notices that were post-
ed for the public hearing in this matter. (R. 219-220) 
In Graham vs. Fitz ( 1876) 53 Miss. 307, the court 
was concerned with the notice requirements pursuant 
to a sale of property pursuant to a trustee's sale. The 
court said on page 314: 
"It was not the duty of the Trustee to make 
daily and hourly observations of the three public 
10 
places of the notices, so as to insure their remain-
ing posted. It is not true that the displacement 
of the posted notices by casualty or design would 
invalidate a sale under them after they had been 
duly posted .... The trustee under this deed of 
trust, may lawfully sell on the day designated 
without regard to the fact of wind or rain or some 
mischievous or evil dispossessed person may have 
removed one or all of the notices. Any other rule 
would invalidate such sales. It would place in 
the power of the mischievous or evilminded per-
sons to defeat every proposed sale under such 
deeds of trust. Any such rule is impractical, 
impolitic, and title would be so insecure under 
it as to forbid competition at such sales and lead 
to the sacrifice of property." 
( 1) Postings Were Made at Public Places as Re-
quired by Law. 
The courts have held that the posting of notices 
upon utility poles or fence posts located at the inter-
section of roads or on road boundaries as being suffi-
cient and that these notices are as likely to be seen as 
at any other place in the territory. The postings by 
Salt Lake County were at three public places as re-
quired by law. State ew rel. Grant School Dist. vs. 
School Board of Jefferson Joint School Dist. (1958) 
4 'Vis. 2d 499, 91 N.W. 2d 219. 
"Public places as applied to the requirements 
of posting notices at public places are those 
places that afford the most publicity r;;ithout 
regard to the title owner .of the property. (~m­
phasis added). See Whittingham vs. Hopkins, 
54 A. 250, 69 N.J.L. 189. 
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'Vhere a tree, post or similar object used for post-
ing a notice is in a place exposed to traffic and the pub-
lic view, posting thereon has been approved as com-
pliance with public "place requirements." 90 A.L.R. 
2d 1224. 
Courts have also rejected the contention that be-
cause the telephone poles were private property and sub-
ject to removal by the owner at any time they could not 
constitute public places. The court held that if a notice 
is posted in a public place where the attention of the 
public is likely to be attracted, the purpose of the law 
is satisfied regardless of who may own the property on 
which the notice is displayed.«» Mahon vs. Buechel 
Sewer Const. Dist. No. 1 (1962, Ky.) 355 S.,V. 2d 
683. (Emphasis added) 
Government buildings, such as courthouses, town 
halls, and post offices have frequently been held suffi-
ciently public that a notice prominently posted on or 
in such a building, satisfies the statutory requirements. 
(Emphasis added) See 90 A.L.R. 2d 1218. 
( 2) Postings Were Made at Three Public Places. 
The county posted three notices at three public 
places, to-wit: The south bulletin board on the west 
entrance of the City and County Courthouse building, 
the utility pole located at the intersection of 23rd East 
and 4500 South adjacent to the property in question 
and the utility pole approximately 210 feet south of the 
(5) See also Schroeder vs. New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962), 83 
S. Ct. 279. 
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intersection at 4500 South and 23rd East adjacent to 
the property owned by Mr. H. R. Hendricksen. 
In Graham vs. Fitz ( 1876) 53 Miss. 307, the court 
held that the requirement of notices to be posted in 
three public places was also complied with where one of 
the notices was posted on the inside of the post off ice 
door which was closed every Sunday after 10 :00 a.m. 
and another notice was posted on the Courthouse door 
in the same town. The Courthouse and the post office 
being within 150 yards of each other. The court stated, 
"that if 150 yards is to be shown a distance to separate 
two public places, what space shall be adopted as great 
enough. The law has no rule on the subject." 
Also in lJ;JcFarlane et al. vs. Witney (1940) 134 
S.l\T. 2d 1047, the court upheld posting on a Court-
house and and a service station which was 400 feet from 
the Courthouse; and the court stated in this case that 
the property where the notices were posted were in no 
way connected through ownership. 
The plaintiffs in the above entitled matter ques-
tion whether or not the notices posted by Salt Lake 
County provided plaintiffs with proper notice of the 
zoning proceedings. What could afford more notori-
ety than notices posted on or near the vicinity of the 
property in question? The Supreme Court of Utah has 
stated in the case of In Re. Phillips, Estate, 86 P. 358, 
44 P. 2d 699, 703 (1035). 
"An affirmative rule of what is sufficient de-
pends so much upon the situation in every county, 
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and perhaps the situation of the cases themselves, 
that hard and fast rules cannot be enunciated." 
Caldwell V8. Moffat (1919) 215 Ill. App. 583, held 
that although the statute provided for posting of notices 
in three of the most public places in town or district in 
the vicinity of the road to be widened, altered, vacated 
or laid out; even if the posting was not in strictly one 
of the most public places in town, the failure to conform 
to a strict construction of the law in respect to this one 
particular notice was but a mere irregluarity and did 
not destroy the jurisdiction of the highway commis-
sioners. (Emphasis added) 
( 3) The Places of Posting were Designed to Give 
Notice Thereof to the Persons Affected as Required 
by Law. 
The person or persons charged with posting no-
tices in public places must necessarily exercise and are 
entitled to exercise at their discretion in the selection of 
locations of the posts where these postings are in public 
places and further, no one may complain that in his 
judgment the notices should have been placed in other 
public places. (5) And it is not important to that a notice 
cannot be read by travelers while riding down the high-
(6) 
(7) 
The Notice requirement pursuant to the Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) 17-27-17, does not contain the language in three of the 
most public places, but states only in three public places. 
Notice to those persons interested in the zoning proceedings 
themselves would be in the vicinity of the property to be ef-
fected· and as cited supra, two of the public places namely 
the t~o utility poles were located in the vicinity of the prop-
erty in question. The courthouse which was ~electi;d as 
the third public place seems a logical choice and is d~s1gned 
to give notice thereof to the persons effected as required by 
law. 
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way in their automobiles and that no such requirement 
is contemplated by the statute itself. It is further not 
necessarily determinative of the question on the posting 
that all of th notices can be read by one standing on the 
highway or road. Wann vs. Re-organized School Dist. 
(1956, Mo.) 293, S.W. 2d 408. 
( b) The Legal Description Used by the County 
iu the Notice of the Zoning Hearing was Adequate. 
The boundaries of the legal description of the 
property in question must only be described with rea-
sonable certainty and with a definiteness sufficient for 
identification. (Speroni vs. Board of Appeals of City 
of Scerling, 368 Ill. 568, 15 N.E. 2d 302.) Zoning ordi-
wmces have been upheld, even though there have been 
m:nor inadequacies in the description of the boundaries. 
39 A.L.R. 2d P. 766. 
Section 17-27-17, Utah Code Annotated, provides: 
"That 30 days' notice of the time and place of which 
shall be given by at least one publication in a newspaper 
of general circulation in the county ... " That on or 
about November 26, 1966, Salt Lake County caused 
to have published in the Salt Lake Tribune notice of 
the zoning hearing of the subject property. Plaintiffs 
in this action have made argument in their brief that 
the description in the notice published by Salt Lake 
County was inadequate. Zoning ordinances have been 
upheld in several cases, even though there have been 
mmor inadequacies in the description of the boundaries. 
( ~ee Ciaffone, et al. vs. Community Shopping Corpora-
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lion, et al. 77 S.E. 2d 817. Speroni vs. Board of Ap-
peals of City of Sterling, (1938) 368 Ill. 568, 15 N.E. 
2d 302. The courts in these cases illustrated in their 
reasoning that the requirement in the legal descriptions 
pursuant to public notice is a test of whether or not 
the description is reasonably certain and with a definite-
ness sufficient for identification. 
Mr. Ralph Y. McClure, the zoning administrator 
for Salt Lake County, and having been employed by 
Salt Lake County about fifteen years, testified that it 
was possible to locate the property pursuant to the de-
scription used by the County, and he further testified 
that the property was described as reasonably as the de-
scription used on tax notices. In fact, he was asked the 
following question: "Does it describe the property as 
reasonable as the actual tax description?'' Answer: 
"Well, it's my opinion it's easier to decipher our de-
scription than the tax notice's." ( R. 208, 209) 
He further testified that the descriptions are not 
the same as the tax notice descriptions for the fact that 
most of the legal descriptions the county receives are 
several descriptions and that the Salt Lake County Zon-
ing Administration combines the descriptions into one 
and describes just the subject property. (R. 209) 
The courts have held on many occasions that the 
subject property need not be described perfectly, so long 
as the recipients of the notice can reasonably ascertain 
from the description that the property in which they . 
are interested may be effected by the enactment. In 
1 
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one c~se, an ordinance was held valid despite the fact 
that the description of property affected by it was dif-
ferent from the property described in the notice pur-
suant to which it was passed. See Bregar vs. Britton 
(1954, Fla.) 75 So. 2d 758, cert. den. 348 U.S. 972, 99 
L. ed. 757, 75 S. Ct. 534. (By implication) The court 
in this case pointed out that it appeared that the prop-
erty affected by the ordinance was included in the 
property described in the Notice. 
The plaintiffs, in their brief at page 20, make men-
tion of the effectiveness of newspaper publications and 
cite a comment by Justice Black in the case of Walker 
vs. Hulchinson, 852 U.S. 112, 116 (1956). That case 
dealt with a condemnation of an individual's own prop-
erty in a proceeding instituted by a City against a 
landowner and that notice of the proceeding to deter-
mine the land owner's compensation was given only by 
publication in the official City newspaper as authorized 
by statutes then in force. The facts in the Walker Case 
are far different than the situation in this matter and 
the comments by J u!)tice Black would in no way be valid 
law as to the fact situation in the present case. It can 
well be understood why in a condemnation proceeding 
against a landowner he was denied due process of law 
by publication only in a newspaper. The plaintiffs and 
appellants in this action in no way have a proprietary 
or possessory interest in the subject property in the 
above entitled matter located on the southeast corner 
of 2300 East and 4500 South, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, and they would not be subject to the same 
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rules and principles of law as commented on by Justice 
Black in the 'Valker case, as cited supra. 
( c) The County Caused 'Vritings and Posted 
Notices to be Exposed to View of the Public for the 
Required Period of Time. 
It is well established that notice was published in 
the Salt Lake Tribune on or about November 26, 1966. 
It has further been established that l\ir. Evans posted 
one notice at the south bulletin board on the west en-
trance of the city and county building. (R. 215) It is 
further established and uncontradicted, that .Mr. Hard-
man posted two notices on utility poles located at two 
public places in Salt Lake County, Holladay, Utah. 
(R. 218-219) 
Plaintiffs' own witness, Mr. Marvin W. 'Vallen, 
identified plaintiff's Exhibit Number 54 and testified 
as to remnants of red markings peculiar to zoning no-
tices posted on the above mentioned utility poles. (R. 
174-175) Further Bill Roderick, Inc., intervenor, pro-
duced a witness, .Mr. Deon Leon Ekins, an uninterested 1 
party in this action, (R. 107) who stated that he traveled 
along 23rd East and 4500 South, Holladay, Utah, daily 
during the period of November, 1966 through Christ-
mas, 1966, that he and a friend were traveling along 
1 
23rd East just south of 4500 South, going skiing, 
the vicinity of the subject propery, and that his friend 
brought his attention to a notice of zoning change. 
(R. 105) He ''"as asked the following question by 
~fr. Everett E. Dahl: "You were able to see the zon-
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ing signs from your automobile?" Asnwer: "Uh huh" 
(affirmative R. 106). He further stated, "We could 
see them real good." 
He was shown plaintiff's Exhibit Number 2, (the 
type of zoning notice used by Salt Lake County and 
containing the red markings) and he stated that he 
remembered the red letters on the notice that he had 
seen. (R. 106) l\fr. Ekins was further asked by the 
court if he looked at the pole and the witness testified 
that he did look at the pole. ( R. 11 O) 
Plaintiff produced several witnesses all of whom 
testified that they had not seen the notice~ that were 
posted by Salt Lake County in the vicinity of the sub-
ject property.Negative testimony of witnesses is weight-
less as against positive witnesses of the defendant and 
intervenor and does not prove that the notices were not 
posted on the poles any more than the notice was not 
published in the newspaper. 
Plaintiffs raise the argument that Salt Lake County 
in no way introduced any evidence as to the policing 
of these notices by the County during this 30 day period 
prior to the hearing itself. A reading of Section 17-27-
17, Utah Code Annotated, in no way sets forth the re-
quirement of policing the notices posted by Salt Lake 
County. This would raise an interesting problem in that 
a property owner in the area that was adverse to the 
zoning change could tear down the posted notices and 
therefore defeat the posting period by his act. This 
interpretation would seem to be unreasonable and im-
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practical. It appears that a reasonable and valid con-
struction of the statute would be one that the statute 
requires notice of at least 30 days in advance prior to 
the hearing. This requirement it would appear contem-
plated a period of 30 days for interested parties and 
parties to be affected by the zoning ordinance or zoning 
amendment to be placed on notice of such hearing at 
least 30 days in advance to allow them enough time for 
their preparation to appear at the hearing and to be 
heard. This interpretation seems reasonable in that the 
statute only requires one notice to be published in the 
newspaper an<l does not require the publishing of no-
tices in the newspaper for each day during a thirty day 
period prior to the hearing. It has heretofore been 
argued that policing of these notices is not a require-
ment of law. 
POINT III 
THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY SALT LAKE 
COUNTY IN THIS CASE MEET THE STATU-
TORY REQUIRElVlENT AND THE PROCE-
DURE AND ACTION PURSUANT THERE-
1 
TO AND AFFORDS EFFECTED PROPERTY 
0 YV NE RS THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
The writer is aware that the United States Su-
preme Court has decided questions on this point as to 
the due process of law issue. One of these decisions, 
M,ullane vs. Central Hanover National Bank, 339 U.S. 
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:306 ( 1950) which was also cited in plaintiff's brief, sets 
forth the requirement of due process of law as being 
one that affords to persons effected, notice reasonably 
calculated under all the circumstances to appraise those 
parties of the pending action and afford them an oppor-
tunity to present their objections. This case involved 
notice by publication to the beneficiaries of a common 
trust fund and the court did consider the problem of 
sufficiency of notice under the due process clause. It 
should be pointed out that in this case they overruled 
petitioner's objections to the violation of denial of due 
process as to the published notice to those persons who 
were unknown to the trustee. However, the court in 
the Mullane case, as cited supra, states at page 59, "We 
recognize the practical difficulties and costs that would 
he attendant on frequent investigations of the status of 
great numbers of 'beneficiaries' many of whose interest 
in the common fund are so remote as to be ephemeral; 
and we have no doubt that such impractical and ex-
tended services are not required in the name of due 
process." (Emphasis added). The court, in this case, 
further acknowledged that the Supreme Court of the 
United States had not hesitated to approve the resort-
ing to publication as a customary substitute in another 
class of cases where it is not reasonably possible or prac-
tical to give more adequate warnings, i.e., where people 
are missing or unknown. (Emphasis added) The re-
quirement of notice of a public hearing prepartory to 
the enactment of zoning measures has typically pro-
vided a constructive rather than actual notice, i.e., pub-
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lication in a newspaper. These statutes and ordinances 
passed pursuant to them have on several occasions been 
attacked as invalid and that without actual notice, the 
owner has been deprived of his property without due 
process of law. (Emphasis added) The courts have 
uniformly held that this contention is without merit and 
ihat the statute need not provide, nor the ordinance be 
passed upon, actual notice.< 5) Plaintiffs' brief cites 
Schroeder vs. New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962), 83 S. 
Ct. 279. This again is a condemnation proceeding and 
it is acknowledged by intervenor that some twenty-two 
notices were posted on trees and poles in the general 
vicinity of plaintiffs' property. However, the court in 
that case was not impressed by the many places that 
notices were posted, but stated at Page 282, "No such 
sign was placed anywhere on the appellant's property." 
The point to be made of this case is that this was a con-
demnation of an individual's own property and not a 
case of general notice to many unknown individuals. 
It should be further mentioned that the general 
rule is that personal notice to property owners effected 
by a zoning regulation or amendment is not a prerequi-
site to the valid enactment thereof; however, the zoning 
enabling statute itself sometimes requires public notice 
for a specified length of time and the holding of a public 
hearing by the zoning commission. 58 Am. J ur. P. 944, 
Sec. 10. Zoning. 
(8) See 96 A. L. R. 2d P. 459. Several jurisdictions and court 
cases are cited therein. 
22 
The essence of the issue of whether or not the 
requirement of due process of law has been met is 
not the criterion of the possibility of conceivable in-
jury, but the reasonable character of the requirements 
having reference to the subject which the statute per-
tains. Mullane vs. Central Hanover National Bank 
' 
339 U.S. 306 (1950). As noted above in this brief, 
we are concerned here with an exercise of a legislative 
power delegated to the Salt Lake County Commission 
and it should be noted that there is a fundamental 
distinction, as regards due process of law, between 
a legislative hearing and an adversary proceeding. It 
is not necessary under the requirement of due process 
of law chat interested parties be present at all stages 
of the legislative deliberations. This requirement is 
properly applicable only in adversary proceedings. 
See Hart vs. Bayless Investment and Trading Com-
pany (1959) 346 P. 2d 1101. A point that should be 
remembered in this case is that the plaintiffs in this 
action are residents of the Holladay area, a few of 
them are neighbors or living adjacent to the subject 
property in this action. None of the plaintiffs have a 
direct or proprietary legal interest in the subject prop-
erty. Their only complaint is that of being affected 
as residents of the area and subjected in this manner to 
a zoning change of the subject property. The court in 
Benner vs. Tribbitt, 190 Md. 6, 57 A2d 346, 353, stated, 
"Exercise of the police power in zoning regulations 
cannot be governed by a plebiscite of neighbors or for 
their benefit." 
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POINT IV 
DEFENDANTS DID OBSERVE STATU-
T 0 R Y AND PROCEDURAL REQUIRE-
l\'.IENTS. 
Plaintiffs in their brief under Point IV, make 
lengthy argument as to whether or not certain proce-
dures were followed by defendant and whether or not 
Bill Roderick, Inc., was a proper applicant. This issue 
is improperly before the court on appeal and should be 
summarily dismissed on the basis that nowhere in plain-
tiffs' complaint, ( R. 1), is this issue raised and further 
nowhere in the Trial Record was this issue heard or 
determined by the lower court. 
However, it should be pointed out that Mr. William 
C. Roderick, President of Bill Roderick, Inc., appeared 
before the court on the 4th day of May, 1967, at the 
hour of 10 :00 a.m.; ( R. 250) , he testified that he began 
negotiating pursuant to the purchase of the prop-
erty in question located at 2300 East 4500 South, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah; and that the actual clos-
ing was consummated on November 23, 1966. At 
that time a Uniform Real Estate Contract was entered 
into by respondent and intervenor. He further testified 
that he had also entered into an Earnest Money Agree-
ment prior to the execution of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract (R. 251). The hearing on the 4th day of May 
was for the purpose of determining a bond that would be 
required to be posted by the plaintiffs in order to restrain 
the defendants from further action in this matter while 
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the above entitled action was on appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Utah. The lower court did issue an order and 
finding that the plaintiff would be required to file with 
the clerk of the court a security in the amount of 
$G,500.00, for payment of such costs and damages as 
may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found 
to have been wrongfully restrained. This was signed 
by the lower court on the 18th day of May, 1967. (R. 
38, 39) The Order Vacating the Temporary Injunc-
tion and the Dismissal of plaintiff's Complaint was 
signed on the 17th day of April, 1967, (R. 31) and the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were also 
entered by the court on said date. (R. 33, 34, 35, 36, 
and 37) Nowhere in said Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law appears the issue as argued by the 
plaintiffs in this matter. 
Plaintiff further complains that the ordinance 
is invalid on the basis that certain procedures within 
the planning commission were not followed in that the 
list of the property owners within 150 feet of the subject 
property were not furnished and that no statements 
were furnished from the property owners in the vicinity 
expressing their position on the proposed change of 
zoning. Now here in the State Statutes, nor in the 
County Ordinances themselves, is any such requirement 
set forth. The procedures complained of must be 
information that the planning staff likes to have in 
arriving at their recommendations. Failure to comply 
with these requirements is not jurisdictional nor man-
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datory in the zoning procedures. Caldwell vs. Moffatt, 
215 Ill. App. 583, (1919). 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT COM.MISSIONERS' AC-
TIONS \VERE REASONABLE AND SAID 
ACTIONS WERE NOT ARBITRARY OR CA-
PRICIOUS. 
In pursuing its authority to zone a county, a county 
commission shall perform a legislative function and has 
wide discretion. The action of the zoning authority is 
endowed with a strong presumption of validity and the 
courts will not interfere with a commission's action 
unless it clearly appears to be beyond its powers or is 
constitutional. Gavland vs. Salt Lake County, 11 U. 2d 
307, 358 P. 2d 633. Also a presumption of validity and 
reasonableness attends zoning ordinances and amend-
ments thereto. 8 McQuillin, _Municipal Corporations, 
3rd Ed. 559, Sec. 25.295. 
Even though it may be true that there was informa· 
tion presented to the commission for denial of the 
amending of the zoning ordinances or as advocated by 
the plaintiffs in this matter, is is also true that informa· 
tion was presented by Bill Roderick, Inc., the inter· 
venor and respondent, in favor of the change of zoning. 
The evidence in the possession of the planning commis· 
sion and before the county commission, was not intro· 
duced into evidence and the matter of reasonableness 
of the determination by the County Commissioners was 
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not an issue during the trial. (Emphasis added (R. 213) 
lt is not the prerogative of the court to substitute its 
judgment for that of the county commission. Parkinson 
vs. Watson, 4 Utah 2d 191, 291 P.2d 400, and Gayland 
vs. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633. 
(a) In Refusing to Permit Certain Property 
Owners a Rehearing on the Zoning Ordinance Which 
Had Been Enacted In This Matter, the Defendant 
Commissioners Acted in a Reasonable Manner and Did 
Not Act Arbitrarily or Capriciously. 
This court has previously held that it would not 
intervene in the wisdom of the subject legislative action. 
Gaylen vs. Salt Lake County, supra. There was not suf-
ficient evidence to even raise the issue of arbitrary and 
capriciousness of the county commission in the lower 
court (R. 213) The plaintiffs did raise an issue of arbi-
trary and capricious action in the commission's failure to 
rescind its action taken on January 11, 1967, (Def. Ex. 
D-39) pursuant to a petition presented to the def end-
ant commissioners on January 10, 1967, (Pl. Ex. 
P-48), which was nothing more than an ex-party pro-
ceeding instituted by the plaintiffs. The procedure 
taken is not provided for by statute and again only 
goes to the merits of the wisdom of the legislative action 
taken by the commission. The mere fact that many 
names were procured on a petition objecting to the ac-
tion of the commission is no evidence of the wisdom of 
the leaislative action taken. It affects only legislative 
b 
expediency which may be considered by the commis.sion. 
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Plaintiffs further contend that the planning com-
mission acted in recommending a denial of the zoning 
change prior to its receipt from the Holladay District 
Planning Commission. It should be noted that the 
recommendations of the Holladay Planning Commis-
sion were merely advisory and its recommendation did 
not have any particular bearing upon the planning com-
mission's action because the planning commission rec-
ommended denial of the zoning change whereas the 
llolladay District Planning Commission had recom-
mended favorable action. Both the report of the Holla-
day District Planning Commission and the report of 
the Salt Lake County Planning Commission were sub-
mitted to the Salt Lake County Commission, who 
eventually made the fina] decision concerning the 
zoning. 
There is very little evidence in the record concern· 
ing the facts dealing with the property in question, and 
the facts either justifying the zoning or not justifying 
ihe zoning of the subject property, except that plaintiffs 
and persons signing the petition were opposed to it. In 
order for a court of law to substitute its judgment for 
the county commission, the evidence must be clear and 
convincing that the commission acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously. The plaintiffs conceded during the trial 
on a direct query from the trial judge that there was 
no issue to arbitrariness and capriciousness as to the 
action taken by the county commission. Plaintiffs' only 
claim to arbitrariness and capriciousness was their 
assertion that the county commission did not reconsider 
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and call an additional public hearing on the matter. 
The petition was filed with the county commission set-
ting forth plaintiffs' objections to the zoning prior to 
the final action by the county commission in enacting 
the recommendations of the planning commission, 
which already were before the commission. (R. 213) 
(b) The Re-zoning of the Subject Property was 
Reasonable and Constitutional. 
The subject property is located at the intersection 
of 2300 East and 4500 South, Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, and is bounded on three sides by public streets. 
It is well to point out to the court that on page 42 of 
the Mr-,Jter Plan of Salt Lake County, (Def. Ex. D-42) 
the provision for the interstate system and access roads 
in the Big Cottonwood District is specified as follows: 
"Circulation within the District will be pro-
vided in the future by the planned system of 
expressways and major arterials which will in-
clude 700 Eas Street; the Cottonwood Express-
way; 2300 East Street; and 4500 South Street; 
all to be improved to provide adequate traffic 
capacity." 
The evidence concerning the facts surrounding the 
zoning is not included in the record on appeal because 
there was no genuine issue as to whether or not the 
zoning was reasonable or proper but the issue at trial 
followed the argument as to whether or not proper 
notice was given of the public hearing, thereby granting 
to the complaining parties, the plaintiffs, herein, a right 
to appear and oppose the matter prior to the decision 
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by the Salt Lake County Commission. The defendants. 
respondents' position is that inasmuch as said notice 
complied with the statutes in each respect, that the 
rezoning of the property, by the Salt Lake County 
Commission, was correct and that it was reasonable 
insamuch as it was based upon the facts and evidence 
presented by all parties at the time of the hearing, 
which was noticed up according to statute. 
It is well to note at this point that the Supreme 
Court has consistently ruled that courts will not sub-
stitute their judgment for a governmental body charged 
with the enactment of legislation. The defendant-re-
spondents' position is that the plaintiffs herein improp-
erly challenged the question of reasonableness, and we 
merely offer a counter argument that it was appro-
priate and reasonable and therefore constitutional. 
( c) The Re-zoning of the Subject Property 1s 
Grounded Upon Reason and Based on the Policy of the 
Statute. 
Plaintiffs contend under this section of their brief 
that the zoning change constituted "spot zoning," and 
that Commissioner Blomquist was prohibited by law 
from signing the zoning ordinance. This specific issue 
did not come up at trial. This is merely a matter of 
argument raised in the first instance with this appeal. 
There are not sufficient facts in this record on appeal 
for the court to attempt to substitute its judgment for 
the County Commission. The burden of proof rests on 
those challenging the validity of the ordinance and as 
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stated in 8 lVIcQuillan, Municipal Corp., 3d Ed. 559, 
Sec. 25.296, page 562. 
"T~e rule that the burden of proof is on one 
asser~mg. the ~mreasonableness, invalidity or un-
conshtuhonahty of an ordinance is applicable 
with respect to zoning ordinances and amend-
ments thereto. Leastwise, where a zoning ordi-
nance is not invalid on its face, the burden of 
alleging and proving facts to support the claim 
of its invalidity is on the party asserting it. *** 
Consistently, there is no burden on a municipal 
corporation to show facts establishing the valid-
ity of zoning." 
''The burden of proof on one asserting the 
invalidity of a zoning ordinance extends to the 
issue of whether or not the ordinance will pro-
mote the public safety, health, morals, order, 
welfare, prosperity or convenience, and it ex-
tends to the issue whether or not the classification 
made by the ordinance is unreasonable, arbitrary 
or discriminatory.***" 
The trial of this case was conducted primarily on 
the issue of the notice given by the Salt Lake County 
Commission for a public hearing on December 28, 1966. 
The problem of spot zoning was given nothing more 
than lip service. The district re-zoned is relatively 
a large tract, exceeding one acre, completely surround-
ed by three public highways, two of which are heavily 
traveled streets and projected to become major arterial 
highways. There is a condominium, Carriage Lane, al-
most across the street and the old established business 
district a very short distance from the property and 
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a public school planned for construction within a very 
short distance to the East of the property. 
The Supreme Court of Oregon in 1954 in Shaffner 
vs. City of Salem, 268 P.2d 599, had occasion to decide 
a similar case of spot zoning concerning a service sta-
tion. This court cited l\lcMullin on Municipal Cor· 
porations as cited above. 
Plaintiffs have also attempted to make certain 
improper inferences as to Mr. Roderick and Com· 
missioner Blomquist on the basis that Mr. Roderick 
said that he knew Commissioner Blomquist business-
wise. ( R. 254) These allusions in the brief serve no 
useful purpose on the appeal of the issues in this case, 
except in an attempt, perhaps, to insinuate that the 
zoning change was accomplished by unsavory and un-
businesslike methods and that the obtaining of the 
zoning was improperly done. The zoning ordinance 
was acted upon and approved by a commission com-
posed of Commissioners Larson, Jenson and Creer. 
prior to two of them leaving office at the conclusion 
of the year 1966. The ordinance was acted upon by 
Commissioners Blomquist and Hanson shortly after 
they assumed office. There is nothing in the record on 
appeal that justifies such a suggestion by the plaintiffs 
as respects Commissioner Blomquist, one of the de· 
fendants-respondents. As a closing point: 
The Linden Methodist Episcopal Church vs. Linden, 
cited on page 54 of plaintiffs' brief, is not in point. In 
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that particular case, the applicant for change of zoning 
was actually a member of the zoning committee, and the 
changes of zoning that said applicant requested were 
passed on by the other councilmen on this committee, 
solely on the basis that he had served faithfully to the 
city for six years and deserved something. Further, in 
that case there was no evidence or testimony presented 
to said council. This is far removed from the situation 
in the present case. 
(d) (See below.) 
( e) The defendant-respondents consider the sub-
titles of paragraph ( d) and ( e) of Point V in said 
plaintiffs' brief to be more in the nature of argument 
and conclusion and are not therefore considered further, 
as it has been amply covered in the brief heretofore. 
CONCLUSION 
It is a clear statutory construction that any ques-
tions as to the validity of an ordinance or its applica-
tion in any case must be resolved with a presumption 
of the validity of said ordinance. As indicated in the 
brief, action such as the rezoning amendment herein 
are legislative actions by properly elected governing 
body, in this case, the Salt Lake County Commission. 
The action of such a legislative body, having complied 
with the ordinances, carries with it a presumption of 
validity. 
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The defendants-respondents' conduct and actions, 
as part of these legislative proceedings, were proper 
in every way as to procedure, notice, and due process. 
The burden of showing that this ordinance is in-
valid is very heavy upon plaintiffs and their evidence 
must be so convincing and overwhelming as to remove 
any doubtfulness as to the validity of the ordinance. 
This procedure also affects not only this zoning ordi-
nance, but perhaps some twelve hundred other zoning or-
dinances passed since the adoption of the basic statutory 
laws pertaining to zoning. The upsetting of this par-
ticular zoning ordinance would place in doubt all other 
zoning ordinances passed by the Salt Lake County 
Commission. 
The Holladay District Planning Commission acted. 
The Salt Lake County Planning Commission acted. 
A public hearing was noticed up along with others 
within the county. The hearing was held before the Salt 
Lake County Commission. After due consideration 
the commission acted and thereupon the legislative 
process in such matters was fulfilled in good faith. 
Some of the issues are not properly before the 
court on appeal. The trial judge allowed plaintiffs full 
opportunity to present its case and had benefit of receiv-
ing both oral and written arguments. It is rather basic 
on appeal that whenever there is a conflict of evidence 
on a particular issue the respondent is entitled to have 
the issue reviewed in a light most favorable to that find· 
ing. The decision of the lower court should be affirmed. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
Gordon B. Christensen 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
T. Quentin Cannon 
Deputy County Attorney 
Metropolitan Hall of Justice 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendants-
Respondents 
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